2: Hudson E-4, 5 (1936) 1938 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

631 merchants played an important part in the diffusion of sedentary cultural traits, and it is
643 possible also that the growth of the mercantile interests of the aristocracy tended to increase disparities of wealth between Kazak classes.[29]

[642] It is difficult to get precise information on how the government of the khan functioned and what were the channels of administration. Although he was surrounded by a number of advisers, usually his relatives, there is little evidence of departmentalization or division of responsibility. Further there was no system of administrative units graded into a series of subdivisions. The relation between each local group and the khan was direct.[31]

651 The most important function of the khan's court, certainly from the point of view of the khan, was the collection of tribute, or taxes (alьm). This took the form, not of regularized imposts, but of occasional demands. Levshin writes[32] that Kazak chiefs had the right to exact tribute from their subjects in the form of cattle and other goods but such tribute was not paid according to any fixed rule and, by my information, perhaps only when the payer happened to feel the need of standing in the good graces of the khan for the sake of protection. But Levshin adds that by divers unregulated means the khans exacted from their subjects a substantial revenue.

The local leaders, however, were generally not averse to assisting in the collection of such taxes because the burden did not fall on them directly. They simply passed on the tax to their own subjects, taking advantage of the opportunity to add on a comfortable percentage which they retained for themselves. Kargabaiev could remember such taxes being discussed by his father, but his information was scanty and generalized. He was sure, however, that everyone, rich and poor alike, was expected to contribute one out of every ten sheep annually for the support of the mullah and also to donate to him all their old clothes. The last detail adds a touch of verisimilitude to an otherwise extremely bald narrative. It was also a frequent proceeding for the bij and aqsaqal to levy local taxes on their own authority.

[701] The demands for taxes arrived in the form of a decree (çarlьq) from the court of the khan. Similar decrees might be issued calling upon local officials to supply the khan with a certain number of fighting men for a particular occasion. Apart from the bodyguards and personal attendants of the khan there was no standing army. After the fighting everyone went home.

643 From what has been said above of the composition of the khanates it is obvious that there was no generally recognized principle of succession to the khan's power.[33] At his

[29] See also Bartold, *Turkestan*, 394, who points out that the interests of the Mongol khans coincided with those of the Moslem capitalists.

[31] Asfendiarov, personal communication.

[32] *Description des hordes*, 393–94.

[33] See also Bartold, *Turkestan*, 60, who in a strong criticism of Howorth writes: " . . . the author should have known something of nomadic life and its political organization, in which there can be no question of a regular order of succession to the throne or of elections according to legal forms, yet he seriously examines the

[158 cont.]
×648 could not destroy their love nor habit of freedom.

When they realized that it was impossible for them to keep their old regions on Lake Balkash, they drew back to the Tsuya
[726] and Sara-Su [Sary-Su?] rivers. Later when they united their forces, they attacked Tashkent and Turkestan and laid them waste, as well as many other cities and villages belonging to those two states, and they acquired so much power over the residents of Tashkent that they forced them to choose their khans from the horde.

Shubai, Arslanov, and Mansur, residents of the former province of Vyatka, came from Tashkent to Orenburg in 1742 (1)

1. See the file for 1742 in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg.

and told how the khan named above ruled in Tashkent until 1739, and that a powerful old Kazak named Tiul Biu shared his authority,
● [650] and every year they levied a tribute on the city. Later Djulbars was killed, but Tiul Biu continued to rule after him for a time and to levy tribute. A certain Kussiak Bek, a tributary subject of Galdan Tsyren, and perhaps his lieutenant, put an end to the power of Tiul Biu.

He was the ruler of Tashkent while Shubai and Mansur were there, but the Dzungarian sovereign received the tribute he took from the people. According to our travelers, under Kussiak Bek the Kazaks had no more influence over Tashkent, but they re-
[726] strained the environs of this city to such a degree that it was as though under a state of permanent siege. They cultivated land under its walls, seized the neighboring forests, and at the slightest dissatisfaction they seized the residents of the city and the merchants who came to trade with them.

×648 Turkestan too was for a certain time in a [159] similar
721 position, although the Kazaks did not hinder the Dzungars from
[439] trading there. As for the small towns between Tashkent and Turkestan, the Kazaks who conquered them during this period kept them until the beginning of the present [19th] century.

[163 cont.]
He soon saw that the behavior of his predecessors toward the Kazaks had produced general misfortune, and that until this people was brought to reason by force of arms it would not stop tormenting his subjects. He acted in accordance with this political fact and assembled an army with which he attacked the Great Horde in 1798 (1). Luck was with him and he won great victories

1. See the unpublished journal of Pospelov, who was in Tashkent in 1800.

over the oppressors in the first battles. Encouraged by these fortunate beginnings, he continued to pursue them and added to the force of arms punishments which could only be conceived by the imagination of an exasperated Asiatic. He had the prisoners decapitated and formed pyramids of these heads in the sight of the enemy army. These frightful sights struck the hearts of the Kazaks with inexpressible terror. Lacking true courage and being accustomed to fighting only for pillage, they could not unanimously resolve to die to avenge the blood of their brothers. They dreaded slavery, and this fear obliged them to submit to Iunus Khodja.

Having thus proved the superiority of severity and decision, this prince seized from the Kazaks all the villages which were in their power and not only demanded complete submission in the future but also reparations, according to Asiatic custom, for the pillage and murder done against the residents of Tashkent. Finally he prescribed rules for their litigations and made them pay a tribute of one sheep out of every hundred. In a word, he reduced them completely to the state of subjects, and later he put them in his armies like his own subjects.

We repeat, however, that he did not subjugate the entire [164] Great Horde, for many Kazaks, even among those neighboring him, escaped his power. Several thousand tents retreated to the Irtysh River and joined the Middle Horde, while others gained the Ak-Tau Mountains with their troops, and still others various other places.

The Kazaks who had become subjects of Iunus Khan remained under the domination of Tashkent as long as this city, with the lands which belonged to it, including Turkestan, did not fall under

[174 cont.]

graciously received by the Empress and would return home soon. Thirdly, he was told that the reports given by Tevkelev had made known Abulkhair's ambitions, and he was directed to keep on good terms with the hordes and with the Karakalpaks.

Abulkhair, who had been wearing himself out at the long wait, having been soothed for a time, the examination of his promises and proposals continued, in order to make them agree with the good of the empire. He was put under obligation verbally and in writing: first, to enforce the safety of the Russian borders [65] contiguous to his horde; second, to defend the merchant caravans and to escort them across the Kazak steppes; third, to furnish in case of need, like the Kalmuks and the Bashkirs, troops levied from among his subjects; fourth, to pay a tribute, or iasak, in animal hides.

He could not carry out a single one of these promises, for, like all the other khans who succeeded him, he did not have enough authority over his subjects. Several experiences soon proved how impossible it was for him to fulfill the first and [175] second promises. At first there was no reason for reminding him of the third, but in time it was proven that it was as risky as the others. The government at first believed it should decline the fourth, and later it was not even brought up, the matter being regarded as impossible.

In exchange for these promises, which were so pompous, Abulkhair, through his son and Tevkelev, asked two things above all: "the confirmation of the office of khan in his family forever, and the building of a city and a fort at the confluence of the [71/2] Ori and the Ural rivers, which could serve him as asylum in case of danger."

The Khan's requests and the attention of the government, and the State Councilor Kirilov was charged with satisfying them. He was a man who had distinguished himself by his geographical knowledge, a mapmaker whose collection of detailed information on upper Asia had aroused admiration as widespread as it was deserved. In addition he had kept all the treatises of Peter I regarding his views and plans concerning the Asiatic principalities contiguous to Russia. These facts decided him to draw up and

[197 cont.]
in this way, and second, he could make his excuses to Galdan for not having sent him hostages, for he was certain that the border commander would not permit this.

This was exactly what happened. Abulkhair had scarcely arrived in Orenburg when Nepluev announced to the Dzungarian envoys that since the khan of the Little Horde was a subject of Russia he had no right to negotiate with foreign princes or to give them hostages. The same was stated for the Middle Horde and Khan Abul Mahmet. The Dzungars replied that the Kazaks were constantly making raids in their territories; that it was impossible to have any peace without taking hostages from them; and that besides they themselves had offered to satisfy this demand just as the Great Horde, which having become their vassal, not only gave hostages but also paid a tribute, and because of this there was perfect peace. The Dzungars were told once more that Russian subjects could neither make nor carry out such promises without the consent of their government. Nepluev himself assumed the burden of preventing any more Kazak raids into Dzungarian territory. It was then suggested to the deputies that they return home, but they answered that although they were thoroughly satisfied with their reception by Nepluev, his words were still not enough; for knowing the Kazaks intimately, who had deceived the Russians and the Dzungars alike with their promises of submission, they could expect nothing but pillage and robbery in the future, and that therefore they dared not return home without hostages. Finally, they said openly that they had been sent by their kungtaidji to Khan Abulkhair and not to the Russian government.

Nepluev and the Khan had considerable trouble in persuading them to leave with the promises they had been given, but they finally departed from Orenburg to go directly to their [198] country. Major Müller, who had been in command of the first Russian caravan which was pillaged by the Great Horde, was sent with these deputies, in order to persuade Galdan Tsyren more firmly that the Kazak hordes were vassals of Russia, and to deliver a letter to him from Nepluev.

[224 cont.]

×643 [661] With this in mind he was granted several favors, including the fact that his youngest son, aged three, was accepted as hostage in place of his eldest, Sultan Pirali.

[661] To this same end there was a return to the thought expressed by Empress Anna in her ukase to Kirilov, dated February 11, 1736, an idea which was in accord with what we mentioned earlier concerning Abulkhair's wish, to build a city at the mouth of the Syr Darya and to begin its population with criminals condemned to exile. But all these projects were unsuccessful.

×648 578 The hatred of the Khans Abulkhair and Kaip, which had been known since the beginning of the 17th century, was not extinguished by their death, but was left as a heritage to their children and their children's children. We shall see in the course of this work that it has not only not been entirely eliminated today, but even has not weakened among the principal descendants of these two chiefs. But before speaking of these contemporaries, we shall describe the history of their ancestors. The constancy with which these two families have hated each other and pursued each other for a hundred years merits special attention. This hatred may go back even farther, perhaps, for we do not know what sentiments existed between Abulkhair's father and Kaip's father.

×648 We have already said that Sultan Batyr, son of Kaip, and his son, the khan of Khiva, had sent ambassadors to Orenburg for the first time in 1650/1750/. Although their proposals were not accepted, being prejudicial to Khan Nurali, who was recognized by Russia, nevertheless the arrival of Batyr's envoys and their intentions of allying themselves with the Russians gave birth to suspicions in Nurali's heart and reignited his hereditary hatred for Batyr. Furthermore he could not view with composure the fact that in spite of the refusal of the [225] Russian government to send all the caravans in general across Batyr's pasture lands, his son, the khan of Khiva, had forbidden his subjects to go from Khiva to Orenburg and to return by a route other than that of the lands of his father. This measure diminished Nurali's influence over trade and the revenues which he took in, like all the Kazak khans, based on the notion of a right over merchandise passing through their steppes.

[643 661 651]

K [257 cont.]
x648 undefended. No one could protect them from the raids of outside
C
648 enemies, for everyone thought about saving himself from an
K
C enemy from within who was far more dangerous. This is why
[669 there was reason to fear then that the Kazaks [258] might join
662] the rebels, enter the empire, and pillage and lay waste all the border settlements. This did not happen because the Yaik Cossacks and the Bashkirs who made up Pugachev's army were enemies of the Kazaks.

Nevertheless, if this hatred prevented them from joining together to march into the interior, it did not protect the borders from the usual pillaging and raids which the Little Horde often repeated during Pugachev's revolt.

We see by a report from the commander who was then in the city of Yaisk (now Uralsk) that Nurali had armed quite a large number of his subjects but was making no move, waiting near the border for the outcome of the affair. One might suppose from the assurances he gave and the zeal with which he extradited several rebels who had taken flight that it was his intention to decide for the legitimate government, but in spite of this the local authorities were very much afraid that in case good luck favored the leader of the insurrection, Nurali might join him.

On this basis and to punish several raids, some across the borders, by the Kazaks during the revolt, the government of Orenburg sent a body of troops against the Little Horde in 1774, after the defeat of the rebels. These troops succeeded in capturing a large number of prisoners, carrying off many animals, and made the audacious bandits feel Russia's might.

K At this same time an event took place in the interior of
[643 the Little Horde which is worthy of attention. Several Turkmen
651] tribes who nomadized near the Caspian Sea chose Sultan Pirali, the second son of Nurali, for their khan. The new sovereign immediately left his father and went to live in the midst of his new subjects on the route which led from Khiva to Saraichik [259] and Guryev. He soon made a name for himself through the high duties he exacted from the merchant caravans.

K In 1775 the Kazaks did not disturb Russia. The Little
[727] Horde remained quiet because it still felt the painful consequences

221 [312 cont.]
[484] have their principal festivals at this time also. They also choose
autumn to practice barantas (2), for this season is favorable because
[527]
[579]
628

2. See footnote 1, Chapter II, page 167, on the barantas.

of the darkness of the nights and the vigor of the horses, which have been restored in good pastures for a whole season and are all the better disposed for long-distance and rapid running.

361 The Kazaks rarely camp in large numbers in the same place,
721 for their herds would be too cramped for space. But they form groups of several families, united by ties of blood or by reciprocal advantages. These groups move in a body from one place to another and do not separate unless there are important reasons. These mobile villages are called auls. The number of tents which comprise them depends on the circumstances.

101 Some Kazaks live in Khiva, the dominion of Bukhara, the
[241] possessions of [313] China, in Tashkent and Kokand, and in these
342] places they have houses, lands, and gardens (1), but their number is very limited.

712
346 1. It is said that in the last years of the 18th century, Karabulat, a rich Kazak of the Durt-Kara tribe of the Little Horde,
[361] built a small fort made of clay on the shore of the Syr [Darya]. Inside he built a small mosque, also of clay, and lived near it in his tent, in the midst of a large number of his kinsmen and faithful adherents, who camped with him. This fort, which
103 soon tumbled down, was called Kara-Bulat-Tam i.e., "Karabulat's wall." Caravans came to this place to buy provisions and paid a
● 651 small toll to the lord for free passage across his pasture lands. There were also some
311 cultivated lands near the fort.

judge dispose of property which was not his own.[2] The unit of property ownership was the family, and still is.

The clan was a military unit, and supplied companies of armed and mounted men to the armies of the khans and sultans. Each clan company fought under its own leader, and had its own distinctive rallying cry (in Turkic uran, from which "hurrah" is derived) which was usually a repetition of the names of illustrious leaders and warriors of the clan. These companies were used not only in wartime but in any time of trouble; they were called to help during feuds, for example, or in fending off thieves.

The clan supplied the khan with taxes in kind (usually livestock), in money, and in labor service. Taxes in money were not common, since money itself was a rarity on the steppe, and was to be found in the hands of traders and moneymen rather than among clansmen or clan leaders. The taxes paid by the clan to the khan were collected by the clan leader and paid for the group as a whole. Aside from livestock, the clan paid in labor service, reckoned in terms of transport duty and communications (messenger service). And the clan supplied able-bodied men in military companies under its own leaders, as required by the khan. The last century in which this system actually worked as a normal matter was the 18th century. By then the Kazakhs had been definitely divided into three hordes, and the khans ruled over each horde separately. By the 19th century, there were only two types of khans, those who came forward to unite their people against the Russians, such as Kenesary and Taimanov, and those who were maintained by the Russians, such as Khan Bukei of the Inner Horde, and his line.[3]

It is perhaps surprising to find a society in which the members are all theoretically related to each other by ties of blood, yet which is riven by class distinctions and by unequal distributions of ranks and privileges. Yet this is the case among many peoples of Central Asia, such as the Uzbeks and Kazakhs, and of Eastern Asia, such as the Mongols. The basis of social differentiation is the ranking of descent lines according to the order of birth of the founders. Once this differentiation is established, and the society is divided into aristocrats (by virtue of primogeniture) and commoners, more complex divisions follow. A leader or khan is then set up as the first among the aristocrats, and he forms a court of aides, ministers, viceroys, field commanders, priests, and so forth. The khan may ennoble a commoner as a reward for bravery in the field, or because he is literate and hence of exceptional utility to the state.

Theoretically, then, all Kazakhs are related to each other by ties of blood. This does not mean that they are all actually descendants of one founding ancestor, for such a figure lies so far in the past that it is necessarily mythical; the truth or falsity of the tradition can no longer be shown. In addition to the myth, however, the establishment of kinship is also achieved by another kind of fiction. Kinship may be based on adoption, whereby a son is regarded as though he were the

[2]Valikhanov, 1904, pp. 150 ff.; Radloff (104), 1893, pp. 513-514; Ibragimov, 1878, pp. 234-237.
[3]Ivanin, 1864, pp. 2-6; Abdykalykov and Pankratova, 1943, pp. 148-261.